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Introduction
The theory of political business cycles in monetary aggregates, pioneered by Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) and given its modern, rational choice interpretation by Persson and Tabellini (1990) , predicts monetary expansions in the quarters leading up to an election and an election-time economic boom. The ultimate goal is to help the government win votes. Empirical tests of this theory have, however, fared badly and the evidence on monetary political cycles of the classical Nordhaus-MacRae type is, as pointed out in the surveys by Paldam (1997) and Drazen (2001) , weak.
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the monetary effects of elections and strive to offer an alternative perspective on the money-election nexus. In contrast to past work on monetary political cycles, which emphasizes deliberate manipulations of monetary policy instruments in the quarters prior to the election, we emphasize that short-run monetary cycles may occur as an unintended by-product of the way that electoral politics work in many countries. This effect is concurrent with the election and works through cash demand.
We investigate if the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M1 -defined as cash and overnight bank deposits -increases in election months in a panel of around 85 low and middle income democracies for the years . We estimate a dynamic, multilevel panel model with year, month and country fixed effects, and we control for many country and time varying factors. We find evidence of an increase in the growth rate of M1 in election months in these countries. The effect is sizable: the growth rate of M1, on average, increases by 0.6-0.7 percentage points or by one tenth of a standard deviation in election months. We are unable to find similar effects in any other month or amongst established OECD democracies. The average effect masks a considerable amount of heterogeneity. The effect is strongest in low income countries, with a large fraction of the population below the poverty line and with low levels of education attainment. The effect is particularly strong in Sub-Saharan Africa, in East-Asia and the Pacific. Unlike the evidence on classical political business cycles in M1 and other monetary aggregates, these results are remarkably robust. They suggest that the election calender induces concurrent fluctuations in M1 that can only be detected by studying monthly (or weekly) data. These results are new to the literature.
Our preferred explanation of the election date effect is that it is a manifestation of systemic vote buying. Vote buying -understood as payments or gifts in exchange for voting in a particular way or for showing up to vote -requires significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before the election is held. This increases the demand for liquidity and affects (recorded) M1 through, at least, two channels. Firstly, the resources needed to buy votes may be obtained by converting illiquid assets into cash. This substitution from broad money into cash or deposits directly increases M1. Secondly, vote buying is an illegal activity and the required funds may come from the shadow economy. Once such shadow economy cash hoardings are used to buy votes, a fraction of them turns into deposits in banks. This will, in turn, increase the money multiplier and offer leeway for an increase in M1. Either way, the result is a spike in M1 just before elections. The finely timed effect on M1, that we find empirically, is consistent with this. Moreover, vote buying, as a viable electoral strategy, requires weak democratic institutions, poorly monitored elections, and an electorate willing to "sell" their votes. The vote buying interpretation is, therefore, reinforced by the patterns of heterogeneity we observe in the data, by the fact that the election date effect cannot be detected amongst established OECD democracies, and by the fact that it is strongest in regions where survey evidence points to widespread vote buying and where democratic institutions are comparably weak.
Vote buying is not the only possible interpretation, however, and there are several alternatives that must be considered. First, the election date effect could be caused by central banks expanding liquidity just before elections. We are, however, unable to detect any election date effect in central bank interest rates and we cannot find any abnormal increases in M1 in the months prior to the election month, as one would expect if the purpose of the central bank's actions is to increase real economic activity. These findings 3 speak against the alternative interpretation, but they do not rule out that governments with full control over the printing press might use that power to fund vote buying or other electoral expenses. Second, political parties demand cash to fund legal election campaigns. While this could induce fluctuations in M1, it takes time to prepare election campaigns. Accordingly, one would not expect the liquidity effect to be present only in the month of the actual election and not in the preceding ones. An equally important consideration that speaks against this alternative is the fact that we cannot find any election date effect amongst established OECD democracies where vast sums of private and public money are expended on election campaigns. Third, elections, in general, increase economic activity and could cause cash demand irregularities. We can, however, not find systematic increases in the growth rate of M1 around other events (such as national celebrations of independence days, etc.) which should be associated with similar irregularities. This casts doubt on this explanation. Finally, the government may pay wage arrays and clear debt to private sector creditors just before elections (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004) . While this does not have a direct effect on M1, except if the funds are drawn directly from the central bank, it could affect the money multiplier. But insofar as the desired deposit-cash ratio of government agencies is higher than that of private agents, then the effect on M1 would be negative, not positive. While we are unable to rule these alternatives out for sure, the interpretation that provides the most coherent account of the collage of evidence that we present is the vote buying explanation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant literatures, places our study within those and discusses the underlying monetary mechanisms that relate vote buying to fluctuations in M1. Section 3 presents some casestudy and survey evidence on the extend of voting buying and the potential link between vote buying and election time spikes in the growth rate of M1. Section 4 introduces our data and identification strategy. Section 5 is devoted to our main results. Section 6 evaluates alternative explanations. 4 2 Background: Political cycles, money and vote buying Political business cycle models have so far guided the search for a possible impact of election dates on monetary policy. The assumption of these approaches is that politicians who seek reelection will, besides fiscal tools, employ monetary instruments to generate a favorable economic environment prior to an election.
1 The original Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) model focuses on a Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment and predicts an expansion of monetary aggregates or a reduction in central bank rates prior to the election. is not less ambiguous: Paldam (1979) fails to find evidence of election year monetary expansions; Alesina et al. (1992 Alesina et al. ( , 1993 , at best, find weak evidence of a cycle in M1, but not in the money base; Leertouwer and Maier (2001) fail to find a central bank interest rate cycle in the OECD countries, while Klose (2012) reports that interest rate policy is less reactive to inflation and more reactive to output fluctuations prior to an election; Dreher and Vaubel (2009) find an electoral cycle in foreign exchange interventions.
None of these contributions pay attention to the immediate role of the election date for monetary aggregates. This is understandable since monetary policy affects growth and 1 For evidence on political business cycles in public finance variables, see, e.g., Brender and Drazen (2005) ; Veiga and Veiga (2007) ; De Haan and Klomp (2013) and Aidt and Mooney (2014) .
2 Alesina et al. (1997) offers an excellent overview of these models.
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employment with considerable lags (4 to 6 quarters) and monetary expansion prior to an election, therefore, must start well before an election date. Since monetary policy cycle considerations do not point to an immediate impact of an election, there has been a lack of interest in higher frequency (monthly) data. In fact, most of the literature makes use of quarterly or annual data which preclude the identification of concurrent election date effects.
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In contrast to this existing literature, we highlight a new reason why the election calendar might induce fluctuations in monetary aggregates which does not relay on direct central bank intervention. We explore how short-run monetary cycles occur as a byproduct of electoral politics as conducted in many low and middle income countries with weak electoral institutions. In particular, we focus on the concurrent effect of elections on cash demand and explore the possibility that abnormally high monetary growth in the election month may be indicative of systemic vote buying. Detection of such an effect requires higher frequency data (monthly or even weekly and daily data) than those which traditionally have been considered in the political business cycle literature.
We use the term vote buying to refer to two related strategies for winning elections.
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One strategy is to offer a monetary payment as a direct exchange of cash for votes (e.g., Stokes et al. 2013; Hicken 2011; Shefter 1977) . Another strategy is to buy turnout, that is, to offer cash payments to induce core supporters to cast their vote (see, e.g., Nichter 2014) or to induce opposition voters to stay home (see, e.g., Cox and Kousser 1981) . In addition to cash, parties often distribute a wide range of other material goods such as food, clothing, a bag of rice, as well as services such as medical care, transportation to the polling station etc. on the day of the election (Helmke and Levitsky 2006) . The political science and economics literature is abundant with survey, case-study, and field experiment 3 Klose (2012) is a recent exception employing monthly data but his focus is on variations in the parameters of the Taylor rule across the election cycle.
4 Political parties use many strategies to win votes. We focus on pre-election attempts at delivering non-programmatic benefits to voters in return for their political support or promise of support in the election. An important alternative explored, for example, by Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) is to promise post-election programmatic benefits. Such promises will not have direct, pre-election effects on monetary aggregates or other macroeconomic variables.
evidence of systemic vote buying.
5 Historically, vote buying was facilitated by the absence of the secret ballot and by suffrage restrictions that created small electorates.All presentday democratic societies embrace secret ballot and universal suffrage. Secret ballot makes it hard to verify whether a voter whose vote is bought actually votes as agreed. Mass electorates make it expensive to buy enough votes to affect election outcomes. Yet, multiple forms of systematic vote buying persist in many modern democracies.
Effective systems of vote buying are often organized hierarchically in what is sometimes referred to as "political machines". In such systems, the resources to buy votes are allocated to middlemen or vote brokers who know the particular voters within their sphere of influence and who through repeated interaction can, at least to some extent, guarantee that deals are kept (Sobel 2005 
Survey evidence on the extent of vote buying
One might ask if vote buying really occurs on a scale that could, in principle, induce effects on a macroeconomic scale. Survey evidence suggest that it does. Figure 1 reports data from the Afro-and Latino-barometers on the fraction of survey respondents who report that they had "been offered a material benefit in exchange for a vote" or that they know of other people who had. 6 We note that the average share of people reporting vote buying is about 17% in Africa (weighted by population) and about 25% in Latin America (unweighted). In some countries, e.g., Benin, Uganda and the Dominican Republic, close to half the population reports knowledge of vote buying. 7 It is clear from these data that vote buying is widespread in many parts of the world, in particular in African democracies (Collier and Vicente 2012; Jensen and Justesen 2014) . The amounts of money spent on vote buying is also substantial. For example, Phongpaichit et al. (2000) estimate that, during Thailand's 1996 election, 30% of the electorate was offered cash in exchange for votes, with an average offer of 27 USD. In Taiwan, many voters were offered about 10 USD for a vote during the 1993 election (Wang and Kurzman 2007) . Based on a household survey, Finan and Schechter (2012, p. 869) estimate that in Paraguay during the 2006 municipal election voters were offered, on average, 48 USD in exchange for their vote.
6 The Asian, Arab, or European barometers do not have questions on vote buying. 7 Social desirability bias suggests that voters tend to under-report having received money or gifts in exchange for their vote (see, e.g., Corstange 2012) . The work by Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012) on Nicaraguan municipal elections shows that the bias can be very big: in a survey-based list experiment, 24% of the voters were offered a "gift" in exchange for their vote, but only 2% reported this fact when asked afterwards in a survey. 
Case-study evidence on the monetary effects of elections
Several central banks publish weekly or daily data on M1, others report by month and most by year. The weekly and daily series allow us to track monetary movements around elections with varying degrees of accuracy and it is illuminating to consider some case studies before turning to the econometric analysis of monthly data. The cash in the Armenian economy increased by 20 billion AMD (or by over 5%) in less than 10 days preceding the elections. This spike is concentrated very close to the election day, reaching its peak on the first working day after the election weekend and gradually declining during the following weeks. vote buying, along with electoral violence and fixes to falsify vote tallies, were common currency in this and other Nigerian elections (Lucky 2013; Collier and Vicente 2014) .
In an Afro-barometer survey undertaken half-way through the election campaign, 12% of the interviewed acknowledged that they had been offered something in return for their vote (Bratton 2008, p. 623 14 to have high levels of corruption (e.g., Transparency International 2014). Cross-country studies reveal a strong association between weak political institutions and vote buying, in particularly amongst "young" democracies (Keefer 2005; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008) .
Evidence from Africa and Latin America, moreover, highlights a strong relationship between poverty and vote buying within a given country (Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Jensen and Justesen 2014) . This, arguably, suggests that systemic vote buying flourishes mostly in societies with weak electoral institutions characterized by ineffective monitoring, lack of credible alternative strategies that would allow parties to reach mass electorates, weak electoral accountability, and a significant fraction of the voting population willing to exchange their vote for pre-election material benefits. Insofar as the correlation between the supply of money and the timing of elections, shown in the diagrams above, is related to vote buying, we would not expect to find similar effects in countries with comparably strong political institutions. 
Data and identification strategy
We collect monthly data on the amount of narrow money (M1) defined as the total amount of cash in circulation plus transferable deposits held by all money holding sectors. Our main sample consists of 85 low and middle income countries for the years between 1975 and 2009.
11 We also collected data for the 13 "old" OECD countries.
12 For each country, we record the date, month and year of each general election held during this period. 12 OECD membership is defined as of 1975, i.e., at the beginning of the sample period. Our estimates remain robust if we exclude countries that obtained OECD membership in 2009 or 2014 (see Table A3 ).
To be included in the sample, a country must, therefore, as a minimum hold regular elections and its central bank must report monthly data on M1. As a consequence of these restrictions, the panel is unbalanced. Table A2 in the appendix lists the sample of countries and the number of months out of the maximum of 420 for which each of them qualifies to be in the sample.
To estimate the effect of elections on the monthly growth rate of M1, we consider the following three-ways fixed effects multi-level panel model:
where the dependent variable -∆M 1 -is the growth rate of M1 in country c in year y and month m; Election is a dummy capturing the timing of elections, and Controls is a vector of control variables. The vector Controls includes GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, the inflation rate, and resource rents as a share of GDP, measured at the level of countries and years, and the exchange rate against the US dollar, measured at the monthly frequency.
14 In some specifications, we also control for the quality of institutions (using the Polity IV index of democracy normalized to be between zero and one 15 and for whether a country in a given year is a new democracy in the sense of Brender and Drazen (2005) . 16 In dynamic specifications, we add the lagged value of ∆M 1 with up to k lags. All models include country (µ), year (η) and month (ν) fixed effects, and some also include country-specific month fixed effects. is the error term.
The main variable of interest is Election. It captures the timing of elections and is measured in two alternative ways. The first measure simply records the month in which 14 We obtain these data from World Development Indicators (2014) and World Economic Outlook (2015).
15 Center for Systematic Peace (2015) 16 Brender and Drazen (2005) defines a country as being a new democracy during its first four elections following a transition from autocracy to democracy after which it becomes an old democracy. We do not control for the quality of institutions in all specifications because the Polity IV index is not defined for some of the small countries in the sample.
an election takes place. Specifically, the dummy variable Election month is defined as being equal to one if an election takes place in country c in year y and month m and zero otherwise. Data on M1 is measured at the end of each month and Election month may, therefore, in cases where the election takes place early in a month, mostly capture (monetary) events happening after the election. The second measure takes into account the precise timing of an election within a month. In the spirit of Franzese (2000), we define Election day as being equal to 1/(62 − x) for the pre-election, 1/x for the election, and 1/(32 − x) for the post-election month and zero otherwise, where x is the date of the election within the election month. Table A1 reports summary statistics for all the variables and lists the data sources.
The parameter of interest is β 1 . It measures the election date effect: the increase (or decrease) in the growth rate of M1 in election months relative to non-election months within a given country and year. It can be given a causal interpretation if the timing of elections, conditional on the controls and the three-ways fixed effects, is unrelated to .
This assumption is satisfied in countries where the election date is pre-determined, but could be violated in countries where the incumbent government can decide on the timing of elections. We return to this issue below. We estimate equation (1) with a fixed effects estimator. In the dynamic specifications, this causes Nickell bias. However, since our data are monthly, we have up to 420 time periods, so the size of the bias is likely to be very small.
Main results
We present the main results in three subsections. First, we report the estimates of equation (1) for the main sample of low and middle income countries. Second, we explore potential heterogeneity in the estimate of the election date effect within that sample.
Third, we offer our interpretation of the results. Table 1 reports the main estimates of the average election date effect for Election month in columns (1) to (6) and for Election day in columns (7) to (10). Column (1) shows a static specification of equation (1) while column (2) adds dynamics with three lags of the monthly growth rate of M1.
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The average election date effect
17 In both specifications, we find a significant increase in the growth rate of M1 in election months. Columns (3) and (4) add controls for the quality of democratic institutions and for whether a country at a given point in time is a "new"
or an "old" democracy. We see that this makes little difference to the point estimate and the statistical significance of Election month. In our preferred specification in column (2), the average size of the election month effect is about 0.67 percentage points. This corresponds to one tenth of a standard deviation. Column (7) reports the corresponding results for Election day which takes the precise timing of the election within a month into account. The average election day effect is significant at the five percent level and corresponds to an increase in the growth rate of M1 of about 2.3 percentage points.
As noted in section 2, the increase in cash demand induced by wide-spread vote buying might be accommodated by conversion of illiquid assets such as long-term deposits (which are part of M2) into more liquid deposits and cash (which are part of M1). Empirically, we should then observe an increase in the M1-to-M2 ratio around the election. Table 1, columns (5) to (6) report specifications of equation (1) in which the dependent variable is the change in the M1-to-M2 ratio from month t to t − 2. 18 We observe that the M1-to-M2 ratio increases in election months. This suggests that part of the election month increase in M 1 is due to conversion of illiquid assets into liquid ones. 
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(8) With data recorded by month, the dependent variable ( M 1) exhibits strong seasonal patterns. Insofar as politicians can time election dates within a certain time window (e.g., a calendar year) and they perceive it to be beneficial to hold elections in months which are known, for seasonal reasons, to be associated with high economic activity and strong growth in M1, our baseline results could be driven by reverse causality. Inspection of the data on the timing of elections shows that the frequency of elections by month is not uniform across the year. For example, October to December, typically periods of high economic activity, on average, host over five times more elections than January to August. We include the month fixed effects in all models to control for this possibility. Column (8) reports a more demanding specification which includes country-specific mouth fixed effects. 20 We observe that it makes little difference to the size of the point estimate and the election day effect remains statistically significant. We can, however, go one step further and seasonally adjust the monthly M1 series for each country by the X12-ARIMA procedure used by the US Census Bureau. Columns (9) to (10) report estimates based on the seasonally adjusted data. We observe that the election day effect continues to be significant at the 5% level but that the point estimate is a little smaller than previously (around 1.4 percentage points). This is expected because the seasonal adjustment smooths the variation in M1 around elections in countries where elections always take place in the same month. A final check is to look at the sub-sample of 18 countries in our main sample which have fixed election days. The baseline results hold for this sub-sample [not reported]. All in all, this does not suggest that the results are due to election date timing effects and reverse causality.
Heterogeneity in the election date effect
Exploring heterogeneity in the election date effect is important because it offers potential insights into the underlying mechanism behind the average results reported in Table 1 .
In Table 2 , we split the sample by geographic region. The top panel shows the results
for Election month while the lower panel shows the results for Election day. We observe that the election month effect is consistently statistically significant in East-Asia and the Pacific (column 1) and in Sub-Saharan Africa (column 6). In the specifications with Election day, the positive point estimates in Latin America and in South-Asia become statistically significant. We can also engage with the possibility of heterogeneity in the election date effect by studying its interaction with underlying economic characteristics. 21 We focus on four characteristics: education attainment (net enrollment in secondary and tertiary education); poverty (defined as the share of the population earning less than 2.00 US dollars per day); and unemployment (defined as the fraction of the workforce out of employment). We summarize the results in Figures 3(a) to (d) which show point estimates of the interaction effects along with 95 percent confidence intervals. (Table A4 , column 2) (b) Secondary Education (Table A4 , column 5) (c) Poverty (Table A4 , column 3) (d) Unemployment (Table A4 , column 12) 21 We do not observe these characteristics by month. Accordingly, we interact the two election timing variables with the year-country average of the relevant characteristics. 22 The regression results are reported in Table A4 in the appendix. and with higher unemployment rates, and it is not statistically significant for relatively prosperous places with low unemployment.
Interpretation
Our baseline result is a robust, statistically significant, and economically meaningful monthly electoral cycle in the growth rate of M1. We interpret this as evidence of vote buying. This interpretation is bolstered by the pattern that we observe when we interact the election timing variables with underlying economic characteristics. We know from previous studies of vote buying that uneducated populations are more prone to electoral corruption (e.g., Krishna 2003) . We also know that poverty and unemployment is correlated with electoral corruption and self-reported vote buying (e.g., Jensen and Justesen 2014) . The fact that we find evidence that the election date effect is larger in countries with low enrollment in secondary and tertiary education, or with a high fraction of the population living below the poverty line, or with high unemployment is consistent with the vote buying mechanism. The regional pattern, with the largest effect being observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, points in the same direction.
It is clear, however, that other mechanisms could be at play, either as a complement to or as a substitute for the vote buying mechanism. It is, therefore, essential to evaluate alternative explanations carefully. The rest of the paper is devoted to that task. At this point, we simply note that the heterogeneity we observe in the estimate of the election date effect is hard to square with most of these alternatives, while vote buying provides a straightforward explanation for the observed pattern.
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Alternative explanations
In this section, we evaluate alternative explanations for the election date cycle in M1.
We consider the following alternatives to the vote buying mechanism: i) the central bank actively expands liquidity just before elections; ii) political parties demand cash to fund legal election campaigns; iii) elections, in general, increase economic activity and the demand for liquidity; and iv) the government pays wage arrays and clears debt to private sector creditors just before elections.
Monetary political business cycles
In line with traditional theories on monetary policy cycles, governments may use their influence on the central bank to engineer a monetary expansion prior to elections. The purpose is to reduce unemployment or generate additional economic activity in the hope that this will improve the government's re-election prospect. In contrast to vote buying which affects M1 through an increase in the demand for liquidity, the monetary political business cycle requires an active expansion of the primary supply of money and, therefore, must involve the central bank. Moreover, since monetary expansions affect the real economy with significant lags, the central bank intervention would have to take place well in advance of the election. Table 3 reports two sets of results that evaluate this possibility. First, we investigate if the increase in the growth rate of M1 occurs in the months prior to the election month.
Columns (1) to (4) show that this is not the case. (5) to (8) show that the central bank's lending rate neither changes in the election month nor in the months prior to that. These two sets of results strongly speak against the classical monetary political business cycle explanation of our results. They, however, do not rule out that governments with full control over the central bank could drawn on primary liquidity just prior to elections in order to buy votes directly or indirectly through targeted spending. We note that such effects would be consistent with the voting buying interpretation of the election date effect. To further probe the issue of traditional monetary political business cycles, we aggregate the monthly M1 data to the quarterly frequency and redefine the election dummy to be equal to one in election quarters and zero otherwise (Election quarter). With this data, we can estimate three-ways fixed effects panel models similar to those typically used in the empirical literature on monetary political business cycles (e.g., Alesina et al. 1993) . Table 4 shows the results for the quarterly sample. We observe a significant increase in the growth of M1 four quarters before the election quarter (column 5) for the sample of low and middle income countries.
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These results, on the one hand, provide further evidence against the classical monetary political business cycle as an explanation for the cycle we find in the monthly data. On the other hand, by studying the monetary data at different frequencies, we are able to disentangle the concurrent monetary effect of elections, which we attribute to vote buying, from monetary expansions aimed at generating a Nordhaus-MacRae type political business cycle. Both appear to be present in our sample of low and middle income countries, but the later materializes as a monetary expansion four quarters in advance of the election, as one would expect given the speed of the monetary transmission mechanism, and, therefore, cannot offer an explanation for the election date effect. 24 We have also aggregated the data to the yearly frequency. Table A5 in the appendix shows the results for the yearly sample. We observe that we cannot find any evidence of a traditional monetary political business cycle at that frequency. We have estimated similar models for the sample of the 13 "old" OECD countries. We find no evidence of cycles in neither the quarterly nor the annual data. Notes: The data is quarterly. The variables Election quarter (t+i) for i = 1, .., 5 are coded one in quarter i before the election. All regressions control for GDP growth, GDP p.c., inflation, the exchange rate, resource rents; include six lags of the dependent variable; and country, year and quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries.
Legal campaign spending
The election date effect that we have identified could, in principle, be driven by legal spending on election campaigns. Like vote buying, election campaigns may generate unusually high demand for money which may manifest itself as unusually high election month growth in M1. Election campaigns, however, take time to plan and spending on campaign staff, advertising etc. is, unlike spending on vote buying, spread out over a longer time period before elections. The fact that the monetary election date cycle that we have identified is concentrated precisely in the election month and not in the months leading up to the election, therefore, speaks against legal campaign spending being the main cause of the election date effect.
Elections and election campaign spending go hand in hand everywhere. Accordingly, if the election date effect in the sample of low and middle income countries were caused by election campaigns, a similar cycle should be present in the sample of the 13 "old" OECD countries. After all, vast sums of private and public money are spent on campaigns in all these countries. Equally importantly, the "old" OECD countries have long-established democratic institutions, strong accountability, vigilant media, and an independent judiciary and they generally score highly on indexes of the quality of institutions (e.g., Freedom House 2012). While isolated instances of electoral corruption are observed also in those countries and reported by the media, the institutions are such that systemic vote buying is not likely to prevail. We can, therefore, plausibly rule out systemic vote buying as the cause of any monetary election date cycle in these countries which would then have to be attributed to election campaigning (or some other cause). Table 5 reports estimates of equation (1) with data from the 13 OECD countries only.
We find no evidence of any monetary election cycle, neither in the election month nor around the election day, or during the months leading up to the election. This suggests that the monetary election date cycle that we find in the sample of low and middle income countries does not just reflect legal election campaign spending. We can, of course, not rule out that part of the cycle is generated by such spending, or that there are sys-28 tematic differences in the way campaigning is conducted and funded in the two samples.
However, if campaign spending were the only or even the main cause, the cycle should also be observable in the OECD sample. This strengthens our interpretation that the election date effect observed in our main sample is associated with vote buying and that relatively weak electoral institutions play an important intervening role. The variables Election (t+i) for i = 1, .., 3 are coded one in month i before the election. All regressions control for GDP growth, GDP p.c., inflation, exchange rate, resource rents; include three lags of the dependent variable; and country, year and month fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries.
National events
Elections are large national events that generate increased economic activity. This is partly due to the cost of organizing and running elections and partly due to private sector spending on election celebrations. The consequence of this could be extra demand for liquidity which would then show up as an increase in the growth rate of M1 in the election month. To investigate the power of this explanation, we explore the idea that similar monetary effects should, if this is an important factor, be present during other big national events. We collect information on the dates of "independence days" (or if no such day is celebrated in a country, the most celebrated national holiday) and define the dummy variable national independence day as being equal to one in the month in which the "independence day" of a country is celebrated and zero otherwise.
25 Table 6 reports estimates of equation (1) with the election timing variable replaced by national independence day. Columns (1) to (6) show the results for the seasonally unadjusted data while columns (7) to (11) show the results for the seasonally adjusted data. The point estimate is negative and significant at the ten percent level in some specifications (columns 1 and 5). These significant results, however, disappear when the seasonality of the growth rate of M1 is taken into account. Thus, unlike the election date effect, which is positive, significant and robust to the seasonal adjustment, there is no evidence for an "independence day" effect. This makes it unlikely that the election date effect can attributed to the fact that elections are big national events associated with unusual economic activity. Table 6 : Growth of M1 during national holidays
(8) 
Election day as pay day
Opportunistic politicians may pay civil servants a "bonus" or "clear arrays" just before elections in the hope that it will win them votes or, if they control the central bank, they may let the central bank finances pre-election benefits to important constituencies. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) document one important example of the former effect from Russia. They find a sizable increase in direct monetary transfers to voters from the regional governments in the days leading up to the election. This could be viewed as vote buying with public funds. Insofar as the resources needed to finance such public spending come from either a Treasury account or a local government account, and not directly from the central bank, this is unlikely to be the main explanation for the election date effect. 26 The reasons is that such funds will be counted as part of M1 before and after they are transferred to the bank accounts of the government employees or creditors or are handed out in cash. The underlying financial transactions would, therefore, not involve a direct substitution of illiquid for liquid assets. 27 Any effect on the growth rate of M1 would have to come from an increase in the money multiplier. Under the plausible assumption that government funds are held mostly in deposit accounts while the beneficiaries of the transfers hold some of their liquid funds in cash, the transactions would reduce rather than increase the average size of the money multiplier. Although we cannot entirely rule out that part of the election date effect could be a by-product of a high frequency political spending cycle, direct vote buying appears to offer a more plausible and consistent explanation.
26 If the funds come from the central bank, they would, as noted above, constitute an injection of money to the economy and affect M1 directly. An example of this is Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. His government controlled the central bank and apparently funded large off-budget transfers to key supporters in the run-up to the election in 2009 from this source (Economist 2012). The empirical support for such effects from broader samples of countries is, however, not strong Honig 2009, 2010) .
27 For example, the EU manual (European Central Bank 2015) says "A harmonized definition of the money-holding sector, which comprises all non-MFIs resident in the Euro-area (except central government). In addition to households, non-financial corporations and financial institutions which are not MFIs are included, as well as state and local governments and social security funds. Central governments are considered to constitute a "money-neutral" sector, with one exception: central government liabilities with a monetary character (Post Office accounts, national savings accounts and Treasury accounts) are included as a special item in the definition of monetary aggregates."
Cross validation and "back of the envelope calculations"
To further bolsters the vote buying explanation, we present some cross validation checks and "back of the envelope calculations".
Cross validation
Insofar as the estimated election date effect is caused by vote buying, the effect should be bigger in countries which accordingly to available survey data are more prone to electoral corruption. For the purpose of investigating if this is the case, we create a cross-country data set with two measures of the size of the election date effect. The first measure is a simple country average of the growth rate of M1 in election months. The second measure is the estimate of the beta-coefficient (on Election month) obtained by estimating equation (1) Moreover, the prices reported in the literature ignore the fact that the dealers and brokers make lots of money. Since this adds to M1, the gap between implied and reported prices is overestimated.
Conclusions
This paper offers a new perspective on the monetary effects of elections. We report robust evidence of a systematic monetary expansion in the month of elections in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies. The expansion amounts to about one tenth of a standard deviation in the month-to-month growth rate of M1. Our preferred interpretation is that the expansion is demand driven and that it is induced by systemic vote buying broadly understood. 
(8) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: All regressions control for GDP growth, GDP p.c., inflation, the exchange rate, resource rents, new democracy, polity IV; include three lags of the dependent variable; and country, year and month fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries. Table A5 : Political business cycles in M1 around election years 
